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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This case involves the prevailing defendants/appellants Hames' (Han1es) application

for attorney fees incurred before, during and after Han1es successfully obtained a11 order
compelling arbitration of the plaintiff/respondent The Grease Spot, Inc. 's (Grease Spot) civil
action against them. This case asks this Court to examine the jurisprudence under Idaho
Code § 12-120(3) in relationship to Idaho Code § 41-1839 and to constrne these two feeshifting statues similarly to authorize an award of attorney fees despite the referral of the
dispute to arbitration.

B.

Procedural History
This action was for breach of a contract for the purchase and sale of The Grease Spot,

Inc. based on the asserted violation of a non-competition clause in the agreement. R., pp. 1-25.
The complaint also asked for relief based on the breach of the covena11t of good faith and fair
dealing, for unjust enrichment, violation of the trade secrets act arising out of the breach of the
contract a11d for injunctive relief arising out of the breach of the contract.

Grease Spot

instituted this action on July 5, 2005. Grease Spot prayed in part for its attorney fees pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 12-120. R, p. 12. Hanies moved to dismiss and compel arbitration based on
an arbitration provision in the contract. The arbitration provision was silent on the question of
attorney fees. R., p. 23. Grease Spot objected.

After a hearing a11d briefing, the trial court

entered its order compelling arbitration and staying litigation on Mai·ch 20, 2006. R., p. 33-36.
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The matter was then arbitrated at a hearing before the Hon. Ron Schilling on March 20 and 21,
2007. Judge Schilling issued his decision on June 25, 2007. R., pp. 42-50. The arbitration
award was confirmed by the court and judgment in behalf of Harnes was entered on October 1,
2007. R., pp. 51-54. The judgment did not contain a Rule 54(b) certificate. Harnes made a
timely application for attorney fees and costs on October 11, 2007. R., pp. 55c68. Grease Spot
objected and moved to disallow the Harnes' application. R., pp. 68-.76. After a hearing held
December 6, 2007, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on January 22,
2008. R., pp. 77-81. The Grease Spot and the co-defendant Balcer Commodities stipulated to
an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice of the claims between them, which was entered March 27,
2008. R., pp. 82-83. That order made final the prior judgment between the Grease Spot and
Harnes. A timely notice of appeal was filed May 8, 2008, R., pp. 84-87 and an amended notice
of appeal showing service on the court reporter was filed June 4, 2008. R., pp. 88-91.

C.

Statement of Facts
The facts relevant to this appeal are contained in the transcript of the hearing on

December 6, 2007 and the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order. The trial court
denied Harnes' application for attorney fees incurred before and during arbitration and in
obtaining confamation of the arbitration award and entry of judgment, except for those
attorney fees the trial court felt were attributable to the issue on which Harnes prevailed in
the civil litigation - the motion to compel arbitration.
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II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Whether the trial court erred in denying most of Hames' attorney fees incurred in the civil
action before the matter was referred to arbitration and all of Hames' attorney fees after it
retun1ed?
Whether the trial court erred in denying Hames' attorney fees in a suit to recover in a
commercial transaction where the matter is referred to arbitration, the arbitration agreement
is silent on the question of attorney fees, and the arbitrator makes no decision to grant or deny
attorney fees to the prevailing party?
Whether Hames are entitled to attorney fees on appeal?

Ill.

l.

ARGUMENT

The standard of review.
The interpretation of statutes is a question of law over which this Court exercises free

review. Paolini v. Albertson s, Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006); McLean v.

Maverick Counhy Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006).
The Comi construes the statute to give effect to the legislative intent, based on the
plain, ordinary meaning of the words used. Paolini; Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School

Dist. # 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). Statutes that are in pari materia
must be construed together to effect legislative intent. Statutes are in pari materia if they
relate to the same subject. Paolini; City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139
Idaho 65, 69, 72 P.3d 905, 909 (2003).
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2.

Section 12-120(3) is a fee-shifting statute in pari materia with Section 41-1839.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is substantive law, not a procedural right. Myers v. Vermaas,

114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296, 297-99 (Ct.App. 1988); Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d
120, 126-27 (1989). Idaho Code § 41-1839 is also substantive law, and amendments to it
have only been given retroactive effect by specific legislative enactment. 1996 Idaho Sess.
Laws 1307, 1308, 1309; J.R. Simplot Co. v. Western Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 977
P.2d 196, 198 (1999); see also Union Warehouse and Supply v. Illinois R.B. Jones, Inc., 128
Idaho 660, 669, 917 P.2d 1300, 1309 (1996) (noting the retroactive effect of the 1996
amendment).
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) shifts the attorney fee responsibility between the parties in
civil actions involving commercial transactions and allocates the cost of using the court
system to resolve disputes in a facia.lly neutral manner.

It is not a penalty. Sanders v.

Lanliford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823827-28 (Ct.App. 2000).

Likewise, Idaho Code § 41- 183 9 has the purpose to guarantee that insureds who are
forced to litigate perfonnance of the insurance contract receive the full amount due
undiminished by the costs associated with litigation. Section 41-1839 is not a penalty but an
additional sum rendered as just compensation. Barber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 129
Idaho 677, 931 P.2d 1195, 1200 (1997); Emery v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244, 815
P.2d 442, 445 (1991); Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 293, 404 P.2d 634 (1965).
Section 41-1839 is an implied tenn in the insurance contract and modifies the general
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American Arbitration Association rule that the parties must bear equally all expenses of
arbitration, except those associated with the presentation of witnesses. Emery, 120 Idaho at
247; 815 P.2d at 445. It is not, however, an implied tem1 that will supp01i an independent
action for its enforcement. Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168,
1175 (1996).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has asked but not answered the question whether Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3) becomes an implied term in a contract involving a commercial transaction.
Storrer v. Kier Const. Co1p., 129 Idaho 745, 932 P.2d 373, 375 (Ct.App. 1997). In Storrer,

the Idaho Court of Appeals did hold that Idaho Code § 12-120 will not support an
independent action for its enforcement. Id., 129 Idaho at 747, 932 P.2d at 375.
Section 41-1839(4) states that it and Idaho Code § 12-123 provide the exclusive
remedy for the award of statutory attorney fees in disputes between insureds and insurers
arising under any policy of insurance and that Idaho Code § 12-120 does not apply to those
disputes. See Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161,
166-67 (2005) (recognizing rule as limited to disputes between insurer and insured -other
commercial transaction disputes within the scope of Idaho Code § 12-120(3)) and Primary
Health Network, Inc. v. State, 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307, 314 (2002) (awarding the

prevailing party attorney fees under Section 12-120 in a suit over a c01mnercial transaction
involving insurance but not a dispute between an insurer and an insured).
The amendment to add subsection 4 to Idaho Code § 41-1839 was an apparent
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legislative response to Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 127 Idaho 830, 907 P.2d 807, 812-13
(1995), in which the Idaho Supreme Court had awarded statutory attorney fees to the insurer
under the facially neutral provisions of Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). J.R. Simplot Co. v. Western
Heritage Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 582, 977 P.2d 196, 198 (1999).

Other than the distinction that Section 41-1839 is a one-way street unless Section 12123 is satisfied, it meets the same criteria as Section 12-120(3): it is substantive, it is not
punitive, and it allocates the expense of litigation in specific circumstances. Thus, Section
12-120(3) and Section 41-1839 are in pari material.
3.

Under Section 41-1839, an insured is entitled to an award of attorney fees, including

attorney fees incurred in the course of arbitration between the insured and the insurer,
provided that two conditions are met.

In Emery v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244, 815 P.2d 442, 444-45 (1991), the
Court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to the insured under Section 41-1839
incu1Ted during the entire litigation process, including the arbitration proceedings. That
Idaho Code§ 7-910 limited the arbitrator's authority to award attorney fees and the American
Arbitration Association rules did not authorize an attorney fee award did not limit the
authority of the district court to do so pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839. The Court reasoned
that Idaho Code § 41-1839 became an implied provision of the insurance contract, citing
Pendlebury v. Western Casualty & Sw'. Co., 89 Idaho 456,406 P.2d 129 (1965).

The insured's right to attorney fees in arbitrations with the insurer was not absolute,

6

however. No right to attorney fees accrued under Section 41-1839, unless the insured had
been compelled to bring a suit to obtain an amom1t justly due under the policy of insurance.
Although Section 41-1839 was an implied provision of the insurance contract it would not
support an independent action for fees by the insured against the insurer. Wolfe v. Farm
Bureau, Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168, 1173-1176 (1996).

The conditions for an award of attorney fees under Section 41-1839 were:
(1) [the insured] has provided proof of loss as required by the
insurance policy; (2) the insurance company fails to pay an
amount justly due under the policy within thirty days of such
proof of loss; and (3) the insured "thereafter" is compelled to
bring suit to recover for his loss.
Id., quoting from Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 671, 735 P.2d

974, 982 (1987).

In Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601, 604-05
(2002), the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned the third "compulsion" prong of the Hansen test,
disapproving Anderson v. Farmers Insurance Co., 130 Idaho 755, 759, 947 P.2d 1003, 1007
(1997). See Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614, 617-18
(2007). So to the extent that compulsion presented a justification to award attorney fees
against insurers in civil actions referred to arbitration, it no longer does so.
4.

Under Section 12-120(3) the same analysis applies. Where a suit is over a commercial

transaction, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees. This entitlement to
attorney fees in the prevailing party applies whether the contract constituting the commercial
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transaction has an attorney fee provision. This entitlement to attorney fees should apply even
though the civil action is referred to arbitration on the motion of a party.
Storrer v. Kier Const. Corp., 129 Idaho 745, 932 P.2d 373, 376 (Ct.App. 1997), Barbee
v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657,661 (2006) and Moore v. Omnicare, 141

Idaho 809, 118 P.3d 141, 149 (2005) all involved applications for attorney fees or suits for
attorney fees after the completion of arbitration and are inapposite. In Storrer, the Comi of
Appeals affim1ed the trial coU!i's decision that a request for attorney fees through an application
for confimwtion of an arbitration award was not a civil action. A party claiming attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) must prevail in a civil action.

The court noted that the

co1mnercial transaction had been decided in arbitration, not in a civil action. 129 Idaho at
747, 932 P.2d at 375. In Barbee, the CoU!i rejected an action for attorney fees pursuant to
Idaho Code§ 30-1446 subsequent to an arbitration award. In Moore, the CoU!i overruled the
arbitrator's award of attorney fees where the Asset Purchase Agreement required that the
parties bear their own costs and fees of arbitration, including specifically attorney fees.
Compare Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031, 1039 (2003) (arbitration
agreement specifically awarded attorney fees to prevailing party). The purchase and sale
agreement in this case was silent on the issue of attorney fees.
In this case, Grease Spot filed a civil action involving a commercial transaction and
prayed for relief including attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120. Han1es defended the
civil action until the tJial court stayed the litigation and ordered arbitration. The trial court
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rejected Harnes application for attorney fees incurred in the arbitration, and incurred by
Harnes in the civil action before and after the referral to arbitration, concluding that the only
"claim" on which Harnes prevailed in the civil action was the motion to compel arbitration.
This doesn't make sense.

The Idaho cases teach that applications to confirn1

arbitration awards standing alone are not civil actions that support applications for attorney
fees under either Section 41-1839 or Section 12-120. How then, can the "claim" contained in
a motion to compel arbitration be a civil action supporting the trial court's limited award of
attorney fees in this case. Harnes appreciates the trial court's decision to make the limited
award of attorney fees for the effort incurred in compelling arbitration, but that was not the
gravamen of the civil action. The gravamen of the civil action was the breach of the purchase
and sale agreement.

If Hames had been unsuccessful in their motion to compel arbitration and the matter
had proceeded to trial against Harnes and Baker Commodities, there would be no doubt that
0

the prevailing party in that action would have been entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code

§ 12-120(3). Why then, once the litigation is stayed and the matter involving one of two
defendants is referred to arbitration, should there be a different result?
Until very recently, this Court had not decided a case where there is a suit over a
commercial transaction and during the course of the suit the matter is referred to arbitration. 1

1

Harnes recognize that dicta in Barbee v. WMA Securities, Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 146 P.3d 657,
662 (2006) and Deelstra v. Hagler, 145 Idaho 922,
, 188 P.3d 864, 867 say that filing a
civil action before arbitration still does not permit the trial court to award attorney fees
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The parties and the trial court did not have the benefit of this Court's decision in Deelstra v.
Hagler, 145 Idaho 922, 188 P.3d 864 (2008) at the time of Harnes' application for attorney

fees and costs. Deelstra answers the first question on appeal: whether Harnes are entitled to
their attorney fees before and after referral of the civil action on a commercial transaction to
arbitration. They are, and the trial court's decision denying most of Harnes attorney fees
before the matter was referred to arbitration and Hames' attorney fees after the matter was
returned from arbitration should be reversed and the matter remanded for reconsideration of
the attorney fee application in light of Deelstra.
As tantalizing close as Deelstra came, it did not decide the question in this case: is the
prevailing party in a civil action over a commercial transaction entitled to attorney fees under
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), where during the course of the civil action the matter is referred to
arbitr·ation, the arbitrator has the arbitr·ation agreement, the arbitration agreement is silent on
the issue of attorney fees, and the arbitrator does not presume to decide the question of
attorney fees.
Hames concedes that Deelstra decided that the trial court improperly modified the
award of the arbitrator to deny the prevailing party attorney fees incurred in arbitration. Even
though the parties both asked the arbitrator to award attorney fees to the prevailing party, no
written arbitration agreement was ever presented to the arbitrator.
Here there was no award by the arbitrator on attorney fees, so there was nothing for

incurred in arbitration under Idaho Code§§ 30-1446 and 12-120(3).
10

the trial comi improperly to modify.
Deelstra also did not reach the apparently dichotomy between this Court's treatment

of attorney fees incuned in arbitration involving suits between insureds and insurers and this
court's treatment of attorney fees incuned in arbitrations involving commercial transactions.
The two statutes, Section 41-1839 and Section 12-120, are in pari materia and should be
treated the same. Neither is a penalty. Each is intended to be an additional sum to represent
just compensation. Each is a substantive right. Only Section 41-1839 is a one-way street,
while Section 12-120 is facially neutral. This Court has decided that Section 41-1839 is an
implied term in an insurance policy; so far this Court has not made the same decision for
Section 12·120. These distinctions are, however, without a difference. Calling Section 411839 an implied term in an insurance policy is just a fiction to circumvent the restrictions in
the Idaho Arbitration Act, the American Arbitration Association rules, and presumably
language in insurance policies requiring the parties to bear their own attorney fees. There is
no reason that the same fiction should not be indulged in commercial transactions. Those
who enter into commercial transactions in Idaho are held to knowledge of the substantive
law, which shifts fees to the prevailing party. The public policies furthered by indulging such
a fiction are identical.
Yet, insureds are entitled to an award of attorney fees in a civil action to recover the
amount justly due under a policy of insurance including the attorney fees incuned in
arbitration, while the prevailing party in a commercial transaction is denied the same right.
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Unless there is a special place in Hell for insurance companies, which would make Section
41-1839 a penalty, there is no reason to treat these two statutes differently. This case squarely

puts the proposition that either both insureds and prevailing parties in suits over commercial
transactions should get their attorney fees when they prevail or neither should.
5.

Harnes are entitled to their attorney fees on appeal.

This appeal fortuitously

anticipated the decision in Deelstra that Harnes are entitled to their atton1ey fees in this suit
involving a commercial transaction, at least for the time before and after the refen-al to
arbitration.

Harnes also submit that they are entitled to their attorney fees incun-ed in

arbitration for the reasons stated above. In order to vindicate the Hames' statutory right to
have the responsibility for attorney fees shifted to the non-prevailing party in a civil action
over a commercial transaction under Idaho Code § 12-120(3), Hames are entitled to their
attorney fees on appeal.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Hames are entitled to their attorney fees incun-ed before and after the refeITal to
arbitration in this civil action over a commercial transaction.

Hames are entitled to their

attorney fees incuJTed in arbitration, because there is no reason for discriminating against
prevailing parties in cormnercial transactions. Hames are entitled to their attorney fees on
appeal. Therefore Hames request that this Court reverse the decision of tl1e trial court, and
remand the matter for consideration of Hames attorney fee claim in light of Deelstra and in
light of a decision entitling Hames to their attorney fees incun-ed in arbitration.
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